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 The Thirteenth Finance Commission’s recommendation to increase the vertical 
share of tax devolution to states will help, but its horizontal distribution formula leaves 
much to be desired. One, its design is such that two of the four key indicators are in 
conflict with each other. Two, the Commission’s revised road map for fiscal consolidation 
at the centre and the states, which recommends state-specific, year-wise, fiscal 
adjustment paths, not only limits the fiscal manoeuvrability of states but also impinges on 
their fiscal autonomy. Three, its design of the grant for elementary education has the 
potential to reduce the expenditure of states rather than augment it. The need to look at 
intergovernmental transfers from the right perspective of federalism, where the states and 
the centre are seen as equal partners in development and not from a narrow technocratic 
viewpoint, cannot be stressed more.  
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Deficit Fundamentalism vs Fiscal Federalism: Implications 
of 13th Finance Commission’s Recommendations  
 
 
The institution of the union finance commission (UFC) as a statutory body to act 
as an independent arbiter in matters relating to transfer of resources from centre to the 
states is a unique feature of Indian federalism. Although there are multiple channels of 
transfers operating simultaneously in India, the largest shares of resources to the state is 
devolved through the UFC.
1 This special issue’s purpose is to discuss and debate the 
implications of the recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission (THFC). The 
papers in this issue cover all aspects of the THFC’s terms of references (TOR), 
commented on by well-known scholars in their respective fields, to put the body’s 
recommendations into perspective. My endeavour in this paper is to give a broad 
overview of the key features of the THFC award (2010-15) and their implications for the 
states. The important recommendations of the THFC can be categorised under the 
following heads: 
 
•  Enhanced vertical devolution from 30.5 to 32 per cent of divisible pool of 
taxes. 
•  Revised road maps for fiscal consolidations at the centre and the states. 
•  Suggested design of goods and services tax (GST). 
•  A large number of sector and state specific grants. 
•  Grants for local bodies amounting to 2.5 per cent of the central pool of taxes  
 
This paper examines what some of these recommendations mean for the states, 
given their overall operating fiscal constraints and the fiscal inequality across them. The 
paper also considers whether states will be able to adhere to the fiscal restructuring 
paths proposed by the THFC for them and what their fiscal implications will be. Towards 
this, it undertakes a detailed review of the finances of two states and constructs their 
future fiscal profiles in accordance with the norms proposed by the THFC for fiscal 
consolidation from 2010-11 to 2014-15. 
 
Apart from the introduction, the paper has five sections. Section 1 evaluates 
THFC’s recommendations relating to tax devolution and its horizontal distribution 
principle from the equity and efficiency perspectives. Sections 2 and 3 analyse the 
implications of the revised road maps for fiscal consolidations recommended for the 
states.  Section 4 analyses one of the major state-specific grants – grants for elementary 
education, its design and implications. Section 5 summarises the findings and draws 
conclusions.  
 
                                                  
1 The other channels of transfers include the Planning Commission and various central government 
ministries. Planning Commission transfers are in the form of plan grants, and ministry specific 








As mentioned, the THFC has enhanced the vertical share of tax devolution to 
states from the 30.5 per cent recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission (TWFC) 
to 32 per cent. If we look at the horizontal distribution of this transfer, the aggregate share 
of low-income states
2 has remained more or less stagnant at 54 per cent during the 
award periods of the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC), the TWFC and the THFC 
(Table 1). While the share of middle-income states has declined sharply, that of high-
income states increased from 9.75 per cent to 11.19 per cent during the award period of 
the TWFC, but has declined marginally to 10.94 per cent in the THFC award. The aggre-
gate share of special category states has increased from 7.29 per cent to 9.6 per cent 
during this period. In other words, despite attaching high weightage to the “income 
distance” or “fiscal capacity index” to achieve fiscal equity, the horizontal distribution 
formula has failed to increase the aggregate share of devolution to low-income states. In 
the specific context of some of the low- and middle- income states, their shares in the 
UFC devolution have continued to decline, imposing a huge fiscal strain on their 
finances.
3 It has been pointed out that one of the major reasons for the low level of per 
capita development expenditure in low-income states and in many of the middle-income 
ones is the failure of the transfer system to offset the fiscal disabilities of these states 
(Rao and Singh, 2002) despite having apparently progressive principles of transfers. 
Table 1: Tax Devolution 
 
Union Finance Commission 
Eleventh Twelfth Thirteenth 
Low income states  53.762 53.788 53.618 
Middle income states  29.189 26.842 25.839 
High income states  9.75 11.199 10.943 
Special category states  7.299 8.171 9.600 
Non-special category states   92.701 91.829 90.400 
Total 100 100 100 
              Source: Report of the Finance Commissions (2000, 2004, 2009). 
 
                                                  
2 The group of low-income states is Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, 
Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh. The group of middle-income states is West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and the group of high-income states is Gujarat, Punjab, 
Maharashtra, Haryana, and Goa. This grouping is done by taking the average comparative per 
capita gross state domestic product (GSDP) from 2004-05 to 2006-07 in ascending order, which is 
provided in the Report of the THFC (Finance Commission 2009; subsequently Report). 
3 This is the case with Bihar. Its share in tax devolution has consistently declined over the award 




The horizontal distribution formula of the THFC has four different indicators, each 
with a different weight assigned to it – area (10%), population (25%), fiscal capacity 
distance (47.5%) and index of fiscal discipline (17.5%). Fiscal capacity distance is a new 
indicator, which replaces the income distance used by earlier UFCs, with the rationale 
that it better reflects fiscal capacity. The fiscal capacity distance in a way benchmarks 
states according to their tax capacity, down from the state with the highest fiscal capacity 
and a prescriptive tax effort. The THFC has worked out the average tax to gross state 
domestic product (GSDP) ratios separately for general and special category states and 
applied the group-specific averages to obtain the potential tax effort. This has been used 
to estimate the per capita fiscal capacity at comparable levels of taxation. It has then 
computed the fiscal distance (weight of 47.5%) of each state by the distance of its 
estimated per capita revenue from that of Haryana. The distance so computed defines 
the per capita revenue entitlement of each state based on fiscal distance. But it is worth 
noting what an editorial in the Economic & Political Weekly observed: 
Although, this is an interesting innovation and the THFC claims that this is a 
more direct way of estimating fiscal capacity than the income distance method, it 
is important to remember that the relationship between income and tax is non-
linear because of the differences in the taxable consumption basket between 
high, middle and low income states. Also, as the central sales tax (CST) 
continues to exist, there is significant tax exportation taking place from the 
producing high-income states to the consuming low-income states. Thus, the 
new horizontal formula creates an inherent bias against the low income states 
(2010). 
   Area and population are neutral indicators of need, while fiscal capacity distance 
as explained above tries to equalise the fiscal capacity differences across states. On the 
other hand, the index of fiscal discipline tries to capture the efficiency in fiscal 
management by comparing the own revenue to total revenue expenditure ratio of the 
states at two different points of time. The index of fiscal discipline is worked out with 
2005-06 to 2007-08 as the reference years, and 2001-02 to 2003-04 as the base years. 
 
The existence of fiscal capacity distance and an index of fiscal discipline in the 
same formula contradict the objective of achieving horizontal equity. The reason being 
that while fiscal capacity distance tries to enhance the fiscal capacity of states, the index 
of fiscal discipline tries to limit their expenditure in relation to their own revenue. This, in 
practice, could conflict with each other. One needs to remember that if the objective of 
fiscal equalisation is to provide “comparable levels of public services at comparable 
levels of taxation”, it cannot be achieved by an index of fiscal discipline defined as own 
revenue to revenue expenditure ratio. It needs some measure of expenditure equalisation 
taking into account total revenues, including devolution and grants. If the objective is to 
equalise fiscal capacity, the index of fiscal discipline and fiscal capacity in the same 
formula may send conflicting signals to the states. Finally, given the large-scale inequality 
in government expenditure in per capita terms, it is critical that the principle of devolution 
primarily be driven by equity considerations, especially when a large number of specific-
purpose transfers is anyway given to enhance the efficiency of government expenditure 
and also for state-specific needs. To put this issue in perspective, we have tried to 
examine what the distributional change in devolution across states would be if the index  
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of fiscal discipline criterion is eliminated, and the assigned share of the index is assigned 
to the fiscal capacity distance. The result is in Table 2.  
 
As the table shows, under the new formula, the share of devolution to low-
income states increases quite significantly while the shares of high and middle-income 
states decline. Bihar’s share under the new formula would be 12.659 per cent against 
10.197 per cent recommended by the THFC. Similarly, the share of low-income states 
like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh would go up 
significantly while there would be a decline in the shares of high- and middle-income 
states, particularly those of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat. It is also important to 
note that the fiscal capacity distance criterion penalises states with lower than average 
tax effort for inefficiency by taking the group-specific average tax effort, not their actual 
tax effort, in estimating fiscal capacity distance. In other words, if the fiscal distance is 
estimated with actual tax effort instead of the average, the distance would be higher for 
those with a lower tax effort. In turn, these states would benefit from higher transfers. 
Thus, also having an index of fiscal discipline in the horizontal distribution formula 


































Table 2: Horizontal Distribution Formula: Alternatives and Outcome 
 











1 Andhra  Pradesh  6.937  6.627  -0.310 
2 Arunachal  Pradesh  0.328  0.327  -0.001 
3 Assam  3.628  4.045  0.417 
4 Bihar  10.917  12.659  1.742 
5 Chhattisgarh  2.470  2.512  0.042 
6 Goa  0.266  0.245  -0.021 
7 Gujarat  3.041  2.276  -0.765 
8 Haryana  1.048  0.765  -0.283 
9 Himachal  Pradesh  0.781  0.760  -0.021 
10  Jammu & Kashmir  1.551  1.691  0.140 
11 Jharkhand  2.802  3.033  0.231 
12 Karnataka  4.328  3.865  -0.463 
13 Kerala  2.341  1.897  -0.444 
14 Madhya  Pradesh  7.120  7.596  0.476 
15 Maharashtra  5.199  3.637  -1.562 
16 Manipur  0.451  0.472  0.021 
17 Meghalaya  0.408  0.435  0.027 
18 Mizoram  0.269  0.272  0.003 
19 Nagaland  0.314  0.325  0.011 
20 Orissa  4.779  4.876  0.097 
21 Punjab  1.389  0.990  -0.399 
22 Rajasthan  5.853  6.045  0.192 
23 Sikkim  0.239  0.244  0.005 
24 Tamil  Nadu  4.969  4.130  -0.839 
25 Tripura  0.511  0.553  0.042 
26 Uttar  Pradesh  19.677  21.229  1.552 
27 Uttarakhand  1.120  1.222  0.102 
28 West  Bengal  7.264  7.272  0.008 
  All States  100.000  100.000  0.000 
 Special  category 
states 
9.600 10.346  0.746 
 General  category 
states 
90.400 89.654  -0.746 
              Note: Basic Data from the Thirteenth Finance Commission’s Report. 
 
 
2. Revised Roadmap for Fiscal Consolidation 
 
 
  One of the most significant components of the THFC’s recommendations is the 
revised roadmap for fiscal consolidation at the centre and the states. The basic concern 
of this road map is to bring down the fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP), separately at both the centre and the states, by the end of 2014-15. As mentioned 
earlier, the THFC appears to have been seriously concerned about the fiscal expansion  
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that took place in 2008-09 and 2009-10 to combat the slowdown in India’s economic 
growth caused by the global financial crisis and decided to emphasise the need for both 
levels of government to bring down their level of fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP. The 
centre and all the states, barring West Bengal and Sikkim, had a Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management (FRBM) Act when the THFC submitted its report. The THFC 
has recommended that the states incorporate their new target into their existing Acts or 
introduce it if they do not have one. The THFC’s revised road map for fiscal consolidation 
is not fundamentally different from what was proposed by the TWFC as far as the level of 
fiscal deficit is concerned. The only difference is alternative fiscal adjustment paths for 
states with relatively high fiscal imbalances, with mandated deficit reduction targets for 
every year to arrive at a fiscal deficit of 3 per cent of GSDP by the end of 2014-15. Now, 
two fundamental questions arise at this point. One is the feasibility of bringing down the 
fiscal deficit within the time frame specified by the THFC and the use of deficit reduction 
as a condition for the release of state-specific grants that the Commission has 
recommended. The other is the appropriateness of the proposed road map when it is 
assessed against the backdrop of the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by the Indian 
Constitution to the states.  
 
To start with the first question, we need to recall that the deficits in 2008-09 and 
2009-10 were particularly due to a decline in revenue because of the slowdown in 
economic growth, coupled with an increase in expenditure. The latter was necessitated 
by various stimulus packages and the revision of pay scales in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission (2008). Although these shocks were 
transitory in nature, the adjustment path could be much longer than what has been 
suggested by the THFC. Among the general category states, the THFC has suggested a 
different fiscal adjustment path for Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal, the states with high 
levels of fiscal deficits. Of the 11 special category states, different fiscal adjustment paths 
have been suggested for six — Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, 
Sikkim, and Uttarakhand. The level of adjustment for all the states starts from 2011-12. In 
effect, there is only one year, 2010-11, to bring down the fiscal deficit to a manageable 
level of 3.5 per cent except for Jammu and Kashmir and Mizoram where lower fiscal 
deficit reduction targets have been proposed.  
 
The THFC’s base year for estimating these adjustment paths is 2007-08. As 
many are aware, 2007-08 was dubbed the best year of fiscal prudence by both the centre 
and the states with the actual fiscal deficit remaining much lower than the targets pro-
posed under their fiscal responsibility legislations. But one cannot deny that the deficit 
increased significantly in 2008-09 and 2009-10 (Table 3). So taking 2007-08 as the base 
year for the fiscal adjustment path, leaving aside two out of the ordinary years of fiscal 
imbalance, is not justified from the viewpoint of practical management of state finances 
as well as the implications of the fiscal contraction proposed to be achieved within just a 
year, especially for states with large fiscal imbalances. For example, according to the 
THFC’s proposed fiscal adjustment path, Punjab’s fiscal deficit for 2007-08 was 3.5 per 
cent and this has to be maintained at the same level of GSDP in 2011-12. But if we look 
at Punjab’s level of fiscal deficit in 2009-10 (budget estimate), it is 5.3 per cent of GSDP. 
If Punjab has to bring down the fiscal deficit to 3.5 per cent in 2011-12, as proposed by 
the THFC, the level of deficit reduction will have to be 1.8 per cent in just one year, 2010-
11. In the case of West Bengal, the reduction will have to be even higher at 2.3 per cent  
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of GSDP as there has been a sharp increase in the state’s deficit according to the budget 
estimates for 2009-10. For special category states, the problem is even worse as their 
levels of fiscal and revenue deficits were much more than those of general category 
states in relation to their respective GSDPs for 2008-09 and 2009-10. Given their narrow 
tax base, they have to contract their level of expenditures much more than the general 
category states if they have to comply with the fiscal adjustment path proposed by the 
THFC.  
 
As mentioned, the problem is compounded as reduction in the deficit has been 
linked to transfers of state-specific grants. This kind of selective approach towards 
specific states is unfair and subjective. As evident from Table 3, Kerala, Punjab and West 
Bengal had fiscal deficits in 2007-08 of 3.68 per cent, 3.32 per cent and 3.75 per cent of 
GSDP respectively, while those of Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand were much higher. It 
can be asked why the same fiscal adjustment path has not been recommended for 
Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh as well. In short, this type of selective approach is unjust 
and arbitrary. 
 
Finally, it is mandatory that each state adheres to its fiscal adjustment path if it 
wants to avail itself of state-specific grants. To quote the THFC, “To facilitate 
implementation of the above road map, we recommend that the states’ 
enactment/amendment of their FRLs incorporating the above targets should be a 
conditionality for release of all state-specific grants”. To put it differently, if the states are 
not able to follow these road maps despite their best efforts, they will lose out on a large 
volume of transfers. The total state-specific grants proposed by the THFC add up to Rs 
27,945 crore. The biggest beneficiaries of these state-specific grants would be poorer 
states such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and 
Uttar Pradesh. Together, their share accounts for 37.24 per cent of the total state-specific 
grants, or Rs 10,406 crore. Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal together will lose Rs 4,683 
crore if they are not able to adhere to the proposed fiscal adjustment paths specified for 
each of them by the THFC. It is also unfortunate that the THFC’s fiscal consolidation road 
map has endorsed the same target of deficit that was proposed by the TWFC instead of 
allowing states the flexibility of deciding what their sustainable level of fiscal deficit would 
be, given state-specific economic growth and the interest rate on debt as specified in 
Domar’s (1944) condition of sustainability and the level of primary deficit. Such a 
straitjacketed approach to fiscal reforms and sustainability not only undermines the fiscal 
autonomy of the states, but also could result in mindless cuts in development expenditure 














Table 3: Revenue and Fiscal Deficits of States: A Comparison 
                                                                               (As a percentage of GSDP) 



















                 
1. Andhra Pradesh  -0.05  -0.56 -0.57  2.68  2.81  3.85 
2. Bihar  -4.05  -2.60  -4.04  1.49  5.68  2.44 
3. Chhattisgarh  -3.83  -1.10  -0.71  0.16  2.37  2.25 
4. Goa  -0.96  -0.43  1.59  3.14  4.61  6.33 
5. Gujarat  -0.70  -0.08  0.94  1.56  2.89  2.90 
6. Haryana  -1.45  -0.03 1.59 0.83 2.05 4.02 
7. Jharkhand  2.14  -0.83 0.33 8.98 4.95 5.11 
8. Karnataka  -1.58  -0.28 -0.37  2.24  3.44  2.74 
9.  Kerala  2.28 1.96 1.38 3.68 3.33 2.61 
10. Madhya Pradesh  -3.57  -2.04 -1.00  1.95  3.45  3.79 
11. Maharashtra  -2.50  -0.62 0.89  -0.48 2.36 3.33 
12. Orissa  -3.99  -0.62  1.69  -1.24  2.10  4.28 
13.  Punjab  2.76 2.40 3.42 3.32 4.31 5.29 
14. Rajasthan  -0.94  0.14 0.60 1.94 3.22 3.58 
15. Tamil Nadu  -1.49  0.00 0.27 1.21 2.73 3.13 
16. Uttar Pradesh  -1.00  -1.03  -0.34  4.01  5.16  5.05 
17. West Bengal  2.68  3.66 4.54 3.75 3.67 5.82 
II. Special Category                   
1. Arunachal Pradesh  -19.11  -16.97 6.61  -0.41  22.37  21.12 
2. Assam  -3.60  -2.38  7.07  -1.10  2.75  12.38 
3. Himachal Pradesh  -2.64  -0.91 -0.63  1.71  5.14  3.89 
4. Jammu and Kashmir  -6.97  -9.66  -12.16  8.21  6.68  5.78 
5. Manipur  -20.79  -17.78 -13.79  -1.74  7.46  5.91 
6. Meghalaya  -2.22  -5.43 -2.00  2.53  1.30  5.63 
7. Mizoram  -3.96  -6.53  -4.39  11.86  10.16  5.22 
8. Nagaland                   
9. Sikkim  -15.28  -22.66 -14.21  2.79  13.21  15.39 
10. Tripura  -8.35  -6.55  -2.92  0.16  6.66  10.74 
11. Uttarakhand  -1.79  -1.49  0.47  4.89  3.88  4.57 
Note: (-) sign indicates surplus in deficit indicators      
RE: Revised Estimates; BE: Budget Estimates 








3.  Implications of Revised Roadmap: Comparing  
Two States 
 
In this section we have quantified the implications of the revised road map for two 
states, viz., Bihar and Kerala. The rationale behind the selection of these two states is as 
follows. 
  
•  Bihar is on the bottom rung of per capita income with a low level of 
development spending and a low fiscal imbalance. 
•  Kerala is a fast-growing middle-income state with high per capita 
development spending and a high fiscal imbalance. 
•  Given the differences in initial conditions between these states, it is important 
to examine and compare the differential implications of the fiscal adjustment 
paths proposed by the THFC for them. 
 
It is worth mentioning that there have been significant increases in development 
spending in recent years in both the states. In this context, we need to examine if it would 
be possible for Bihar to follow the proposed path of fiscal adjustment without decreasing 
much-needed development spending. To address this, we first need to see what the 
likely fiscal situation will be in Bihar and Kerala during the award period of the THFC if 
they continue with their present fiscal policy stances. The base year of projection is 2010-
11 (budget estimate) and we have made following assumptions. 
 
•  Tax revenues are expected to grow at their present buoyancy-based growth 
rates. 
•  Non-tax revenues are likely to grow at their observed trend growth rate. 
•  Central transfers are assumed to grow according to their observed trend 
growth rate. 
•  Interest payments are assumed to grow at the average effective rate of 
interest for the year 2010-11. 
•  Other components of expenditure are assumed to grow at their respective 
trend growth rates. 
•  For the entire projection period, the GSDP of Bihar and Kerala are assumed 




As Table 4 shows, if the present fiscal policy stance of the Government of Bihar 
continues, the state will in no way be near the THFC’s proposed fiscal adjustment path. 
Although the revenue surplus of the state will increase from 3.90 per cent of GSDP to 
4.97 per cent of GSDP between 2010-11 and 2014-15, the fiscal deficit will go up from 
2.73 per cent to 6.02 per cent and the debt to GSDP ratio will go up to 38.63 per cent by 
the end of 2014-15. One also needs to find out what the possible reasons are for such a 
                                                  
4 It has to be noted that the annual average nominal rate of growth of GSDP of Bihar from 2004-05 




huge increase in the fiscal imbalance. As evident from the table, both social and 
economic services expenditures as a percentage of GSDP show a sharp increase and 
the capital expenditure to GSDP ratio also rises sharply from 6.63 per cent in 2010-11 to 
11.58 per cent in 2014-15. In other words, the increase in deficits will primarily be due to 
an increase in the development expenditure of the state, provided the growth of 
expenditure remains at the observed level used for the projection. Given low 
development spending (in per capita terms) vis-à vis other states and corresponding 
physical and social infrastructure deficits, such an increase in government expenditure 
would not be possible if the THFC’S proposed fiscal consolidation path is stuck to, unless 
state revenue increases accordingly, which is unlikely given the low resource base of the 
state. 
 
We have estimated the alternative fiscal scenario to see the level of contraction 
in development revenue expenditure required to adhere to the path of fiscal consolidation 
proposed by the THFC. The latter is shown in Table 5. As can be seen from the table, if 
the fiscal deficit has to be at 3 per cent as specified in the fiscal adjustment path of the 
THFC’s revised road map for fiscal consolidation, development expenditures on social 
and economic services are expected to fall sharply between 2010-11 and 2014-15. If the 
entire burden of adjustment falls on capital expenditure, it would increase much less 
compared to the base scenario. As a percentage of GSDP, the increase would be from 
6.63 per cent to 8.26 per cent during this period. The outstanding debt to GSDP ratio will 
fall from 36.45 per cent to 31.54 per cent. So if the Government of Bihar has to adhere to 
the fiscal consolidation path proposed by the THFC, it has to happen through a cut in 
development spending.  
 
Table 4: Base Scenario: Business as Usual Fiscal Adjustment Path 
















Revenue receipts  25.01  25.46 28.07 29.13 30.32 31.65 33.13 
Own  tax  revenues  4.68 5.47 6.32 6.23 6.14 6.06 5.97 
Own  non-tax  revenues  0.87 0.65 0.72 0.79 0.88 0.97 1.08 
Central transfers  19.45  19.33 21.02 22.10 23.30 24.62 26.08 
Revenue expenditure  21.62  25.34 24.17 25.90 27.81 30.12 32.89 
General services  7.98  9.46 9.18 9.51 9.82  10.28  10.91 
Interest  payments  2.85  2.80 2.68 2.71 2.70 2.83 3.12 
Pension  payments  2.64  3.18 3.49 3.69 3.89 4.11 4.34 
Social services of which   9.29 10.68 10.59 11.55 12.67 13.99 15.54 
Education   5.06  5.84  5.61 5.77 5.93 6.10 6.27 
Health  0.78 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Economic  services  4.34 5.20 4.40 4.84 5.33 5.86 6.44 
Capital expenditure  5.29  6.68 6.63 7.57 8.69  10.02  11.58 
Total expenditure  26.91  32.02 30.79 33.47 36.50 40.14 44.48 
Revenue deficit  -3.39 -0.12 -3.90 -3.23 -2.50 -1.52 -0.24 
Fiscal deficit  1.90 6.57 2.73 4.34 6.18 8.49  11.34 
Outstanding debt  35.63 38.15 36.45 36.31 38.04 41.86 48.06  
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Table 5: Reform Scenario: Fiscal Adjustment Path Compliant with TFC 
Recommendations 
















Revenue receipts  25.01 25.46 28.07 29.13  30.32  31.65 33.13 
Own tax revenues  4.68 5.47 6.32 6.23  6.14  6.06 5.97 
Own non tax revenues  0.87 0.65 0.72 0.79  0.88  0.97 1.08 
Central transfers  19.45 19.33 21.02 22.10  23.30  24.62 26.08 
Revenue expenditure  21.62 25.34 24.17 25.90  27.71  29.80 32.20 
General services  7.98 9.46 9.18 9.51  9.72  9.95  10.21 
Interest  payment  2.85 2.80 2.68 2.71  2.60  2.51 2.42 
Pension  payment  2.64 3.18 3.49 3.69  3.89  4.11 4.34 
Social services of 
which 9.29  10.68  10.59  11.55 12.67 13.99  15.54 
Education  5.06 5.84 5.61 5.77  5.93  6.10 6.27 
Health  0.78 0.96 0.93 0.93  0.93  0.93 0.93 
Economic services  4.34 5.20 4.40 4.84  5.33  5.86 6.44 
Capital expenditure  5.29 6.68 6.63 6.23  5.60  4.85 3.93 
Total expenditure  26.91 32.02 30.79 32.13  33.32  34.65 36.13 
Revenue deficit  -3.39 -0.12 -3.90 -3.23  -2.60  -1.85 -0.93 
Fiscal deficit  1.90 6.57 2.73 3.00  3.00  3.00 3.00 
Outstanding debt  35.63 38.15 36.45 34.97  33.68  32.54 31.54 
 
The development spending gap that would emerge due to this can be seen in 
Figure 1. As evident, if the present fiscal stance continues, the development expenditure 
to GSDP ratio will increase from 21.61 per cent to 29.24 per cent during the award period 
of the THFC. If the THFC-compliant path is followed, the increase in development 
spending will be from 21.61 per cent to 25.92 per cent during the same period – much 






The Kerala story is different. Here too, we estimate what the situation will be if 
the present fiscal situation continues, how the debt profile will behave and whether that 
will be sustainable because the state’s large fiscal imbalance has prompted the THFC to 
suggest a separate and specific fiscal adjustment path for it. According to the proposed 
fiscal adjustment path, Kerala has to eliminate its revenue deficit to GSDP ratio by 2014-
15 and bring down the fiscal deficit GSDP to ratio to 3 per cent by 2013-14. However, in 
Kerala, there has been substantial fiscal correction in the financial years 2008-09 and 
2009-10 (revised estimate) and this is expected to be the case in 2010-11 (budget 
estimate) as well. Kerala’s medium-term fiscal plan (MTFP) for 2010-11 to 2012-13 
proposed a fiscal correction path, which targeted reduction of revenue deficit to 0.88 per 
cent of GSDP and fiscal deficit to 3.5 per cent of GSDP by the end of 2012-13. 
 
To get a clear idea about the fiscal correction path in the medium term, 
independent of what is proposed in Kerala’s MTFP, we have estimated the movement of 
key fiscal indicators, based on the assumption that the current fiscal situation will 
continue in that period as well. Our period of projection is from 2011-12 to 2014-15 and 
the base year is 2010-11 (budget estimate). The resulting fiscal path (as a percentage to 
GSDP) is shown in Table 6 and termed, the base scenario. As seen from the table, if the 
present fiscal situation continues, there will be a marginal improvement in revenue 
receipts and a sharp decline in revenue expenditure, primarily due to a decline in general 
services expenditure because of a sharp decline in interest payments. Projections based 
on past growth also show a marginal decline in social and economic services 
expenditures to GSDP ratio in the revenue account, while the capital expenditure to 
GSDP ratio shows marginal improvement. The movement of these key variables, in turn, 
will result in a steady decline in the revenue deficit and the emergence of a revenue 
surplus by the end of the 2013-14, a steady decline in the fiscal deficit to GSDP ratio to 
1.6 per cent of GSDP by the end of 2014-15, and a steady decline in the debt to GSDP 
ratio to 20.1 per cent by the end of 2014-15. Thus, the alarm bell rung by the THFC about 
the deteriorating fiscal situation of the state appears to be incorrect. Disregarding the fact 
that Kerala has improved its fiscal balance significantly in recent years, the THFC has 






















Table 6: Fiscal Profile and Debt Sustainability: Medium Term Perspective  
(The Base Scenario) 
                                                                       (As a percentage to GSDP) 










Revenues  12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.4 
Own  Tax  Revenues  8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 
Sales  tax  6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 
State excise duties  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Stamp duty and registration fees  0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Other  taxes  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Own  Non-Tax  Revenues  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Central  Transfers    3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 
Tax  devolution  2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Grants  1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Revenue  Expenditure  14.2 13.9 13.5 13.1 12.6 
General  Services  6.2 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.6 
Interest  payments  2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 
Pension  2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 
Other  general  services  1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 
Social Services  5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 
Education  2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 
Medical  and  public  health  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Other  social  services  1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 
Economic  Services  1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 
Compensation and 
Assignment to LBs 
1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 
Capital  Expenditure  2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 
Capital  outlay  1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Net  lending  0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Revenue  Deficit  1.5 1.0 0.4  -0.2  -0.8 
Fiscal Deficit  3.5  3.1 2.6 2.1 1.6 
Primary Deficit  1.1  0.8 0.5 0.2  -0.1 
Outstanding  Liabilities  32.0 29.0 26.0 23.0 20.1 
 
Kerala’s fiscal adjustment path compliant with the THFC’s revised road map for 
fiscal consolidation is presented in Table 7. If the state follows the targeted path of fiscal 
deficit reduction proposed by the THFC, the capital expenditure will go up to 3.6 per cent 
of GSDP by the end of 2014-15, with a revenue surplus emerging in 2013-14 and 
continuing thereafter. This substantiates our earlier observation that the level of fiscal 
correction in Kerala in the last four years has been significant and a continuation of the 
same trend will result in a reduction in fiscal deficit much below its Fiscal Responsibility  
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Act (FRA) target. The reform scenario proposed should help the state enhance the fiscal 
space for higher capital expenditure without violating THFC-proposed norms. However, 
this would also mean that Kerala should amend its FRBM Act to revise the target of fiscal 
deficit reduction to 3 per cent instead of the 2 per cent it stands at today. 
 
These two case studies bring out the unjust, arbitrary and, to a great extent, futile 
nature of the exercise called “revised road map for fiscal consolidation” proposed by the 
THFC, which has a uniform deficit reduction target of 3 per cent of GSDP for all states by 
the end of 2014-15, and specifies the path of fiscal adjustment to be followed by 
individual states. If the current fiscal stance is allowed to continue, by the terminal year of 
the THFC award, Bihar’s fiscal deficit would be more than two times higher than what is 
proposed by the THFC and Kerala’s would be almost half of what is proposed. This 
implies that to comply with the norm, Bihar has to reduce its expenditure by around 3 per 
cent of GSDP and Kerala can enhance its expenditure if it so decides. But if we compare 
the proposed state-specific fiscal adjustment paths, Bihar has stricter norms than Kerala 
because, as per the THFC’s assessment, Kerala is a state with higher fiscal imbalance 


































Table 7: Fiscal Profile and Debt Sustainability: Medium Term Perspective  
(The Reform Scenario) 











Revenues  12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.4 
Own  Tax  Revenues  8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 
Sales  tax  6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 
State excise duties  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Stamp duty and registration fees  0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Other  taxes  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Own  Non-Tax  Revenues  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Central  Transfers    3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 
Tax  devolution  2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Grants  1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Revenue  Expenditure  14.2 13.9 13.5 13.1 12.8 
General  Services  6.2 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.8 
Interest  payments  2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 
Pension  2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 
Other  general  services  1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 
Social Services  5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 
Education  2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 
Medical  and  public  health  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Other  social  services  1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 
Economic  Services  1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 
Compensation and 
Assignment to LBs 
1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 
Capital  Expenditure  2.0 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.6 
Capital  outlay  1.7 2.1 2.6 2.6 3.1 
Net  lending  0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Revenue  Deficit  1.5 1.0 0.5  -0.1  -0.6 
Fiscal Deficit  3.49  3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 
Primary Deficit  1.1 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.2 
Outstanding  Liabilities  32.0 29.3 27.2 24.9 23.1 
 
These kinds of wide differences between norms and actual performance arise 
because we do not have state-specific sustainable levels of deficit. It is obvious that given 
the debt sustainability condition, the level of sustainable deficit would be a combination of 
the growth rate, interest rate, and primary deficit. As these are quite different in different 
states, the estimated levels of sustainable deficit would have been different in Bihar and 
Kerala had such an approach been adopted by the THFC. Once the sustainable deficit is 
known, then it is a question of adopting the right fiscal policy options to achieve that 
sustainable deficit in a particular state. This arbitrary 3 per cent target will not only make 
the states take ad hoc policy options in terms of fiscal sustainability but also seriously 
undermine the whole idea of growth and sustainability if it results in cuts in growth- 
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promoting government expenditure, as appears to be what is most likely in Bihar and 
probably many other states. This analysis also brings out that the objective of bringing in 
fiscal discipline in a multilevel fiscal system should be based on state-specific fiscal 
needs, which are intimately linked to growth. 
 
4.  Sector and State Specific Grants 
 
The THFC has recommended a large number of state-specific grants. Apart from 
non-plan revenue deficit grants, these include state-specific performance grants; grants 
for universalising elementary education; environment-related grants, for forests, 
renewable energy, and water sector management; incentive grants to improve the quality 
of public expenditure; grants for maintenance of roads and bridges; and grants for state-
specific  needs. As these grants are conditional, their actual utilisation will largely depend 
on meeting grant-specific conditionalities. 
 
One of the major components is the grant for elementary education, amounting 
to Rs 24,068 crore. The conditionality attached to the release of this grant is that states 
have to maintain the growth of their own expenditure on elementary education at 8 per 
cent per annum during the THFC’s award period. The state-wise growth of expenditure 
on elementary education is given in Table 8. If we take recent years, the all-state 
expenditure on elementary education grew at the rate of 14.6 per cent between 2004-05 
and 2007-08. This is much higher than the 8 per cent prescribed by the THFC. However, 
the big question at the moment is whether states will be able to maintain this high growth 
in education expenditure given the fiscal constraints imposed by the revised road map for 
fiscal consolidation. It may so happen that with THFC-imposed fiscal constraints, many 
states may actually have a lower expenditure despite having the grants for elementary 
education. The design of the grant is such that most of the states would still be eligible for 
it if they bring down their own expenditure from the current level. This is contrary to what 
an equalisation grant is expected to do – augment expenditure for a particular service in 
a specific jurisdiction where it is low. 
 
Coming to the quantum of grants provided, the grant for elementary education 
proposed by the THFC is much higher than what was proposed by the TWFC
5, which 
was pegged at Rs 10,172 crore. The full equalisation requirement as per the TWFC norm 
worked out to Rs 67,811 crore for its award period (Chakraborty, 2005). Thus, the THFC 
grant at Rs 24,068 crore is only around 36 per cent of the full equalisation requirement as 
per even the TWFC norm, that too in nominal terms. The TWFC grant was also better in 
terms of its design and helped the states to augment their expenditure on education.  
 
It is also important to note that the THFC has based the grant for elementary 
education on Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) norms and recommended a grant of 15 per 
cent of the estimated expenditure of each state on the SSA. The rationale given by the 
                                                  
5 For partial equalisation of the per capita education and health expenditures of selected states, the 




THFC is that this grant will augment state resources and provide adequate fiscal space to 
implement the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009. It will also help the states to provide 
for the anticipated increase in their share of the SSA to 50 per cent by the terminal year 
of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-12). This is ad hoc and arbitrary. Instead of 
depending on the SSA norms and justifying its grant on the grounds that the contribution 
of states for the SSA will go up, the THFC should have revised its own norms for 
complete equalisation and given the grants required by states. This kind of partial 
approach towards equalisation may not have the desired outcome. It can at best tinker at 
the margin. As there are strict norms set for fiscal consolidation and adherence to those 
norms is mandatory for the states to avail themselves of state-specific grants, the scope 
for states to increase their expenditure to bridge whatever gap there is in providing 
elementary education appears impossible in the short run and the grants as transfers will 
serve only a very limited purpose. There is also the danger of states bringing down their 
expenditure growth to 8 per cent per annum to adhere to the fiscal constraint imposed by 
the THFC and avail themselves of this grant. 
 
Table 8: State wise Growth of Elementary Education Expenditure 












I. Non-Special Category       
 Andhra Pradesh  4.6  14.7  12.1  9.2  12.0 
Bihar 11.2  43.6  17.1  12.6  23.0 
Chhattisgarh 19.9  6.5  22.7  30.4  19.7 
Goa 11.1  18.0  9.3  16.0  13.8 
Gujarat 16.7  2.5  17.0  15.1  11.9 
Haryana 15.5  13.7  17.1  8.6  13.5 
Jharkhand 41.7  13.7  11.0  32.1  17.8 
Karnataka 21.0  8.9  14.9  21.0  14.8 
Kerala 3.5  5.0  16.9  14.0  12.3 
Madhya Pradesh  8.9  17.4  22.3  -2.7  12.8 
Maharashtra 11.8  3.8  16.8  9.2  10.5 
Orissa 4.0  11.7  6.7  43.9  18.3 
Punjab 0.4  5.0  -3.4  7.7  2.3 
Rajasthan 9.3  23.8  4.0  11.7  12.0 
Tamil Nadu  10.5  3.5  30.5  10.4  15.8 
Uttar Pradesh  16.3  26.0  22.0  19.9  22.5 
 West Bengal  23.1  18.5  12.8  14.2  14.9 
II. Special Category         
 Arunachal Pradesh  11.0  6.6  21.0  19.9  16.2 
 Assam  3.2  -0.2  3.3  10.2  4.2 
Himachal Pradesh  5.0  11.5  26.1  15.0  18.2 
Jammu and Kashmir  0.6  14.3  17.4  5.2  12.7 
Manipur 1.6  20.7  8.9  4.8  11.0 
Meghalaya 11.9  3.8  9.5  36.6  15.1 
Mizoram 14.9  19.2  0.4  12.8  9.5 
Nagaland 4.2  20.2  16.7  5.0  14.1 
Sikkim 15.8  15.6  6.8  18.1  12.7 
Tripura 4.2  -20.8  5.8  -4.2  -5.8 
Uttarakhand 8.0  8.5  8.9  13.4  10.1 







On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that although the 
increase in the vertical share will help the states, the horizontal distribution formula does 
not appear to have made any significant departure from the past in terms of greater 
progressivity of transfers. Also, as explained, the design of the horizontal distribution 
formula is such that the fiscal capacity distance and the index of fiscal discipline are in 
conflict with each other and serve opposite purposes – while the former tries to increase 
the capacity of states to spend more, the latter tries to limit their expenditure in relation to 
own revenues. Both the indicators together in the same formula penalise states twice 
over for the same reason. The design of the grant for elementary education is such that it 
has the potential to reduce the expenditure of states instead of augmenting it. 
 
On the revised road map for fiscal consolidation, it needs to be emphasised that 
suggesting state-specific, year-wise, fiscal adjustment paths not only limits the fiscal 
manoeuvrability of states but also impinges heavily on their fiscal autonomy. This 
approach of the THFC seriously compromises the idea of the Finance Commission itself, 
which, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, is required to protect the fiscal 
autonomy of states. It is high time that India as a federal country starts seriously thinking 
about how to get out of this kind of technocratic approach to a subject that goes beyond 
the deficit numbers and a very narrow idea of fiscal prudence. The prime issue here is 
nurturing federalism in the country by correcting vertical and horizontal imbalances 
without compromising fiscal autonomy, and that cannot be done in a dictatorial way. Even 
though the Finance Commission is an independent arbiter, it should refrain from making 
recommendations that clamp down heavily on the fiscal autonomy of states. Mute 
acceptance of these recommendations by the states and their adherence to them is also 
surprising. Is there a way out from this? The answer probably lies in a deeper 
understanding of the complex issue of intergovernmental transfers and a corresponding 
change in the approach of future Finance Commissions. It is overdue that the issue of 
intergovernmental transfers be looked at not from a narrow technocratic perspective or 
from an implicit view of a benevolent centre giving funds to begging states, but from the 
right perspective of federalism where the states and the centre are treated as equal 
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